This note presents a method of public key distribution using quantum communication of n photons that simultaneously provides a high probability that the bits have not been tampered. A three-state variant of the quantum method of Bennett and Brassard (BB), it provides superior performance (in terms of the number of usable key bits) for n < 18m, where m is the number of key bits used to verify the integrity of the process in the BB-protocol.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography provides an absolutely secure method of communication subject to public exchange of side information. The quantum key distribution method of Bennett and Brassard [1] (BB) uses 4 different polarizations of the photons and a pair of basis states in the detector. The BB protocol is symmetric in its use of the polarizations. After the key has been obtained, this protocol requires the exchange of further information about parity of randomly chosen subsets of the key.
Can we devise a scheme, somewhat in the spirit of joint encryption and error-correction coding [5] , that will not only distribute the key but also provide additional information about the integrity of the distribution process? In particular, we would like to have a method where the additional exchange of information, that is required after the key has been distributed, is unnecessary.
Given the symmetry of the BB method, one would expect that it could not be improved upon. But symmetry-breaking can provide advantage for part of the range of the operation of the system. In this note we consider a variant protocol that breaks the symmetry of the BB method. In our method, three polarization states of the photons and three basis states of the detector are used. We show that doing so provides advantage over the BB method for certain sizes of the key.
The Bennett-Brassard protocol
In the Bennett and Brassard method Alice (A) chooses photons (or other particles) prepared in four polarization states of 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees and sends n of them in random order to Bob (B), who measures each photon using detectors matched in a random sequence to two pairs of orthogonal bases: (0, 90) and (45, 135) degrees. Note that if the directions and the polarizations of 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees are represented by 0, k, 1 and l, it is sufficient to have the directions 0 and k as the bases in the detector. If it is assumed that the photons are sent according to a clock, when the detector outputs nothing (e), it is clear that the input was a photon in a state orthogonal to the detector setting.
Bob now tells Alice the sequence of the bases he used for his detection. Alice informs him which detector bases were correctly aligned. Alice and Bob keep only the data from these correctly measured (or inferred) photons, discarding the rest. Now Alice and Bob test their key by publicly choosing a random subset of bit positions and verifying that this subset has the same parity (defined as odd) in their respective versions of the key. If their keys had differed in one or more bit positions, this test would have discovered that fact with probability of 1 2 . One bit is now discarded, to compensate for the information leaked by revealing its parity. This step is repeated m times, leading to a certification with probability of 1 − 2 −m that their mutual keys are identical, at the cost of reducing the key by m bits. Since the average number of correct alignments between the input bases and the detection pairs is about half of the total number of photons sent, the expected size of the key, certified with the probability 1 − 2 −m , is n 2 − m.
Key distribution with three states
In our asymmetric method, photons are prepared in the polarization states of of 0, 45 and 90 degrees only. Bob uses filters before his detector that are matched to the same polarizations. We have introduced asymmetry at two places: by cutting down on the number of photon polarizations from 4 to 3, and by increasing the number of detector states from 2 (which is equivalent to 4) to 3. Table 1 summarizes the 9 different possibilities between the photon and the detector states for the data from Alice, Bob's detector settings, and what Bob actually receives. Alice's data 0 0 0 k k k 1 1 1 Bob's filter 0 k 1 0 k 1 0 k 1 Bob receives 0 k/e e 0/e k 1/e e k/e 1 Bob sends his filter settings to Alice on a public channel, and Alice uses the same public channel to tell Bob which settings were correct. The latter information makes it possible for Bob to infer which e outputs should be replaced by either a 0 or 1. For example, if Bob is told by Alice that his setting "1" is correct in the 3rd column of the Table, he would know that he should replace his "nothing" output e by 0.
As we can see, out of these 9 cases Bob is able to correctly receive or infer 5 cases. But Eve, the eavesdropper, knows one of these 5 cases, namely where Bob's filter setting was at k. So while the correct recognition rate for Bob is 5 9 , bits at a rate of only 4 9 have guaranteed security. Just these 4 bits out of the 9 listed in the Table will actually be used for creating the key, the fifth bit helps in authenticating the integrity of the process. The latter bits, at the rate of 1 9 , provide confirmation that there has been no tampering with the transmitted photons. As there is a 1/3 probability that Eve would have used the correct filter placement at that spot if she had intercepted the photon sequence and replaced it with her own, the transmission for every 9 bits can be certified to the probability 1 − 1/3 = 2/3.
A probabilistic analysis
Prior to being told the correct locations, the average mutual information, I(A; B), between Alice and Bob is computed by
I(A; B) = H(A) + H(B) − H(A, B).
where H(A), H(B), and H(A, B) are the individual entropy measures of A, B, and the joint entropy of A and B, respectively.
H(A) equals log3 ≈ 1.585 bits. H(B) is computed by first finding the probabilities of the four received states, 0, k, 1, e, which are easily seen to be 1/6, 2/9, 1/6, 4/9, respectively. From this we find that H(B) = 15/9 log3 − 7/9 ≈ 1.864 bits.
Likewise, the joint entropy, H(A, B), is easily computed from the table of probabilities.
H(A, B) = 15/9 log3 + 5/9 ≈ 3.197 bits.
In other words, the amount of information leaking in this system is I(A; B) = log3−4/3 ≈ 0.252 bits/photon, or about 16%. Or the actual uncertainty from the point of Bob or Eve is log3 − 0.252 = 4/3 bits per photon.
Since the k-photons (that constitute 1 out of every 3 photons transmitted) do not ultimately contribute to the formation of the key, the information being sent out by Alice is at the rate of 2/3 × 4/3 = 8/9 bits. With a 50% uncertainty for each photon, only half of them wil lead to the key sequence, so the information rate is now 1/2 × 8/9 = 4/9 bits, which is precisely the value we have argued using a different reasoning. This analysis confirms that there is no apparent weakness in our protocol.
When n photons are transmitted
When n photons are transmitted we will, on an average, be able to obtain 4n 9 bits for the key and an additional n 9 bits for authentication of the transmission process. In other words, the transmission would be certified to the probability 1 − 3 −n/9 . In comparison, the 4-state BB protocol provides n 2 − m key bits and certification of 1 − 2 −m . When n/2 − m = 4n/9, the key bits are the same number for the two cases, or for n = 18m.
We obtain more key bits from the 3-state protocol compared to the BB-protocol for n < 18m. Thus for n = 54 and m = 6, the 3-state protocol gives 24 usable bits, while the BB-protocol gives only 21 usable bits.
Furthermore, the certification probability is higher. The two certification probabilities will be the same if
Or BB-certification probability is higher for m > 0.176n. But this is an impossible range of comparison because the effective value of m in the 3-state protocol is only n/9.
Concluding remarks
The 3-state method sketched here provides unexpectedly good results. It has the unique property that no further exchange of verification information is necessary after the initial steps of the protocol, unless one desires the certification probability to be greater than what is inherent in the system. Quantum key distribution systems described here and elsewhere [2, 3] are fundamentally dual in nature in as much that part of the information must be sent over a classical channel, as happens in the post-photon transmission communications between Alice and Bob. This aspect makes the communication system somewhat similar to those brain models that postulate an underlying quantum basis to cognitive processes (e.g. [4, 6] ). Is the "understanding" of the incoming sensory stimuli facilitated by the filtering information mapped into the neural structures of the brain during the process of evolution?
